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We propose that religion impacts trust and trustworthiness in ways that depend on how
individuals are socially identiﬁed and connected. Religiosity and religious afﬁliation may
serve as markers for statistical discrimination. Further, afﬁliation to the same religion may
enhance group identity, or afﬁliation irrespective of creed may lend social identity, and in
turn induce taste-based discrimination. Religiosity may also relate to general prejudice.
We test these hypotheses across three culturally diverse countries. Participants' will-
ingness to discriminate, beliefs of how trustworthy or trusting others are, as well as actual
trust and trustworthiness are measured incentive compatibly. We ﬁnd that interpersonal
similarity in religiosity and afﬁliation promote trust through beliefs of reciprocity. Reli-
gious participants also believe that those belonging to some faith are trustworthier, but
invest more trust only in those of the same religion—religiosity ampliﬁes this effect.
Across non-religious categories, whereas more religious participants are more willing to
discriminate, less religious participants are as likely to display group biases.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the role of religion-based discrimination in trusting and in trustworthy behaviour when
interacting with people from various social groups or cultures. Understanding the role of religion is important, because
conﬂict between and within different religions is rising globally (The Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014; Grim, 2014)
and fast becoming a deﬁning feature of the post-cold war world order (Huntington, 1996). A standard manifestation of this
religious conﬂict is inter-religious strife. Another, newer dimension involves religious radicalisation and extremism which
can turn individuals against their compatriots and moderate fellow adherents. However, despite its ubiquity, importance
and controversy, economists have only recently developed an interest in the effects religion has on economic outcomes
(Iannaccone, 1998; Guiso et al., 2006; Tan, 2006). Religion can inﬂuence economic behaviour in at least two ways, by
creating differential social group identities (Jackson and Hunsberger, 1999) and through individual differences in religiosity,
i.e. the strength of an individual's religious attachment or commitment to a particular faith commonly measured as religiouser B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
ax: þ44 115 846 6667.
(J.H.W. Tan).
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Mengel, 2013) and acculturation (Guiso et al., 2003) generally affect economic outcomes and might act as conduits for the
economic inﬂuences of religion.
One economic approach to examining these effects is the experimental economics of religion, as critically discussed by
Hoffmann (2013) and Tan (2014), where the inﬂuences of religious variables on various kinds of individual economic
decision are studied systematically in controlled settings. Previous studies demonstrated the ﬁrst effect, that individuals
treat others differently in economic contexts based on same or different religious afﬁliation even when other social iden-
tiﬁers such as nationality and ethnicity are shared. For example, we conducted a laboratory experiment with student
participants from different cross-cutting ethnic and religious groups in Malaysia (Chuah et al., 2014). While participants
cooperated relatively more within their own ethnic groups irrespective of religious afﬁliation, having the same religion as
well enhanced their cooperation further. Conversely, participants divided by different ethnic identity cooperated more when
they shared religious afﬁliation. A ﬁeld experiment where both Indian Hindus and Muslims in Mumbai trusted members of
their own religious groups relatively more (Chuah et al., 2013) lends further support.
However, our work as well as that of other researchers failed to demonstrate the second effect, of religiosity, directly. In
two experiments participants of higher religiosity were equally cooperative (Chuah et al., 2014) or trusting (Tan and Vogel,
2008) than others. These results suggest that religiosity, in reﬂecting an individual's socialisation into and internalisation of
particular religious precepts (e.g. Ryan et al., 1993) does not independently affect consequent behaviour. However, both
studies provided hints of a second avenue by which religiosity might inﬂuence decision making as a vehicle for taste-based
or statistical discrimination. One such hint is that among the entirely Christian participant pool of Tan and Vogel (2008),
those of known higher religiosity receive greater trust from others, and especially (but not exclusively) from those who
share this trait. The second hint is that high religiosity ampliﬁed the higher cooperation which Chuah et al.'s (2014) multi-
cultural participants paid their religious fellows.
In this paper, we propose that religious identities serve as cues on the nature and degree of connectedness between
interacting individuals, and thus religion inﬂuences strategic behaviour, in particular trust and trustworthiness on which we
focus here. In trust games (Berg et al., 1995; Johnson and Mislin, 2011), a sender decides how much to trust a receiver by
sending an amount of money. The receiver receives thrice the amount sent and decides how trustworthy to be in returning a
proportion of it. In equilibrium, by backward induction, assuming that receivers are rational and money-maximising,
senders anticipate nothing in return, and so send nothing. Social connectedness is a psychological concept describing the
closeness of people e.g. family or acquaintance, friend or foe (Aron et al., 1991; Gächter et al., 2015).
We call closeness in religion-based relationships religious connectedness. Consistent with research on social connectedness in
general (Laurenceau et al., 1998), we argue that individual religiosity operates through religious connectedness to affect trust.
Religious connectedness increases with the duration and frequency of interactions, knowledge of others, the extent of (mutual)
self-disclosure, and the number of people in the other's network one is also connected to. Religious beliefs, rituals, experiences
and activities that unite or divide people facilitates this. We consider four forms of religious identity: (1) a connection at the
fundamental level of individual religiosity; (2) group membership based on religious afﬁliation to the same creed; (3) religious
afﬁnity arising from the mere afﬁliation to some religion, regardless of creed; and (4) religious anonymity, where religiosity
effects operate on the wider societal level of prejudice across social identities including non-religious ones.
In turn, we examine four corresponding religious discrimination effects on trust and trustworthiness. The ﬁrst is sta-
tistical discrimination (e.g. Mueser, 1999; Anderson et al., 2006), where more religious people are generally believed to be
trustworthier and treated accordingly. The second is that religiosity ampliﬁes intergroup bias on the basis of religious
afﬁliation. Intergroup processes including taste-based outgroup discrimination or ingroup favouritism are strengthened by
an individual's identiﬁcation with the group (Farnham et al., 1999; Smurda et al., 2006). The third is that religiosity is used as
a social identiﬁer of afﬁnity which unites religious people regardless of creed. The fourth is that religiosity is a correlate of
greater general prejudice, i.e. discrimination based on social identity differences even in non-religion categories
(e.g. Hunsberger and Jackson, 2005).
For this purpose, we conduct a trust game experiment where participants can incur a ﬁnancial cost in order to dis-
criminate between co-participants of different religions and other social identities. We extend the trust game by allowing
participants to make decisions conditional on the social identities of co-participants they might face. We then measure
participants' religiosity and consider their religious afﬁliations, their responses to co-participants of diverse religious
afﬁliations, and corresponding beliefs regarding co-participants' actions. In particular, we study how trustworthy senders
think receivers are or how trusting receivers think senders are. We also test how much senders invest trust or receivers
reciprocate trust. Further, we analyse whether these beliefs and actions relate to the religiosity and religious afﬁliation of
sender and receiver. This informs us on the relevance of statistical and taste-based motives of discrimination, and whether
religiosity per se is related to general prejudice, i.e. on the basis of even non-religious categorisation.
Our design has a number of novel features. In many previous experiments, discrimination was observed in a particular
context such as gender or ethnicity. In contrast, we are able to measure discrimination based on different social identiﬁers
which vary within a multi-national participant pool. This allows us to measure discrimination tendencies in a more general
way, and to compare these across different social identiﬁers. Further, we measure discrimination in participants' intention or
willingness to discriminate as the resources they are willing to use in order to be able to make decisions contingent on the
characteristics of their co-participants. This provides a graduated measure of discrimination intentions, elicited in an
incentive compatible way in line with the costliness of discrimination in many real world settings and economic models
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hypotheses in Section 3. Results are reported in Section 4, before concluding in Section 5.2. Religiosity and trust
Apart from its role in inter-religious conﬂicts across the world, high religiosity within all creeds plays an important part
in a number of pressing contemporary social debates surrounding home-grown terrorism, abortion, contraception and gay
rights. These have clear economic consequences. For example, Indiana's Religious Freedom Restoration Act allows trade to be
refused on religious grounds, while provisions for religious exemptions from public immunisation programmes (in force in
48 U.S. states) can generate negative externalities on an epidemic scale. This provides economists with a clear motivation to
examine the effects of religiosity in economic settings using economic methods.
A few experimental economics studies have examined the effects of religiosity (a.k.a. religiousness, which measures an
individual's attachment or commitment to a particular faith) on economic behaviour. Most use religious service attendance
measures as a proxy and relate this to prosocial behaviour in experimental games.1 Generally, previous research has found
little evidence for the relationship between religiosity variables and behaviour in the trust game. Fehr et al. (2002) found no
effect of the church attendance of German household survey respondents on their decisions in a trust game. Karlan (2005)
measured religiosity in terms of months since last religious service attendance and related this variable to public good
contributions and trust game decisions in a ﬁeld experiment in rural Peru. It was inversely related to public good con-
tribution but only at the 10% level of signiﬁcance. Attendance also did not explain trust game decisions in this study directly.
However, participants with less frequent attendance were sent greater amounts for unexplained reasons. Anderson and
Mellor (2009) measured the frequency of religious service attendance to serve as a proxy for religiosity. This variable was
not signiﬁcantly related to public good game contributions of older adult U.S. participants. Anderson et al. (2010) subse-
quently found a positive effect with college student participants, but only when comparing the corner cases of high and low
attendance. Trust game behaviour here was unrelated to the attendance measure.
Tan (2014) argued that one reason for the mixed results in terms of effect signiﬁcance and direction could lie in the
multi-dimensional nature of religiosity that simpler measures do not capture, e.g. based on attendance alone. Unidimen-
sional religiosity measures like these are unsatisfactory as they fail to tap into the different motivations behind and
expressions of religious attachment (Spilka et al., 2003, p. 28; Hill and Hood, 1999, p. 5), which can manifest behaviourally in
opposite directions (e.g. Tan, 2006). For example, intrinsic spiritual or quest motives for religious attachment are sharply
differentiated from extrinsic ones such as seeking social group identiﬁcation. In response psychologists of religion have
developed a now widely accepted approach (DeJong et al., 1976) which measures individual religiosity in terms of ﬁve
dimensions, religious knowledge, practice of religious activities, belief in religious precepts, personal mystical experience
and consequences of religion on behaviour (Glock and Stark, 1965).
We used such multi-dimensional religiosity measures in a number of previous experimental economics studies with
promising but still inconclusive results. Tan (2006) found the different components of a multi-dimensional measure to
signiﬁcantly affect dictator game offers or ultimatum game responses but in opposite directions. Chuah et al. (2009) used
principal components analysis to derive a multi-dimensional religiosity scale using 15 items from the World Values Survey
(see Inglehart, 1997) which was negatively and (marginally) signiﬁcantly associated with ultimatum game offer sizes among
Malaysian and UK participants. In the study by Tan and Vogel (2008) on German University students, higher religiosity
receivers were trusted more especially by fellow high-religiosity senders. Receivers of higher religiosity returned greater
amounts and especially to more religious senders.
The results of Tan and Vogel (2008) suggest that religiosity can have an indirect effect as a social identity that generates
ingroup favouritism. However, this is inconclusive in that religiosity differences in this study did not explain why senders
trusted more religious receivers more. Alternatively the result could evidence statistical discrimination towards highly
religious people to the extent that they are generally held to be trustworthier. Finally, in Chuah et al.'s (2014) prisoner's
dilemma experiment, shared religious creed raised cooperation within a multi-cultural Malaysian student participant pool.
In contrast, multi-dimensional religiosity as an independent variable in its own right did not explain cooperation. However,
religiosity raised cooperation further when interacted with the shared creed dummy variable. This result suggests a further,
again indirect effect of religiosity as an enhancer of ingroup bias based on shared religious afﬁliation. Alternatively, the result
could reﬂect the greater general tendency of religious individuals to discriminate on the basis of different social identities
including religious creed.
Let us now consolidate these results as behavioural patterns from the perspective of religious connectedness, as outlined
in the Introduction. First, individual religiosity can increase connectedness in three ways. First, the participation in ritual
increases the duration and frequency of interactions between individuals. Second, increases in religious knowledge and
indoctrination increase knowledge of others in the group, e.g. how they think they ought to behave (Tan, 2006). The latter
relates to the access to relevant social category, and in turn the likelihood of using that social categories as stereotypes to
guide behaviour such as trust (Tan and Vogel, 2008). Thirdly and indirectly, common beliefs and experiences engender1 See the survey by Hoffmann (2013) for more detail on the different behaviour and religious measures used in these studies.
Fig. 1. Actions and payoffs for the low (high) stake trust game used in the experiment.
Fig. 2. Experimental interface for the elicitation of trust game decisions for different social identity types and WTD. In this example, the category is
religiosity.
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(Tan and Vogel, 2008) or religious afﬁliation (Chuah et al., 2014). Such effects should weaken as religious connectedness
weakens, via the above processes as well as a decreasing overlap in social networks. In the limit, we have interactions across
group markers that are orthogonal to religion. If so, would individual religiosity lose its bite on discrimination?3. The experiment
3.1. Measuring trust and religion
Following previous studies we used a trust game as a behavioural measure allowing for the expression of discrimination
(e.g. Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Holm and Danielson, 2005; Falk and Zehnder, 2013). As shown in Fig. 1, we used a binary
version of the trust game because it is cognitively less demanding on participants, so as to reduce biases from fatigue in view
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parameterisations of the trust game. In the ﬁrst, namely the “low stake game”, the sender decides whether or not to trust,
i.e. to send 50 or 0 to the receiver. If the sender sends the money, the receiver receives three times this amount and decides
whether or not to be trustworthy by returning 100 or 0. In the second, i.e. the “high stake game”, we increase the stakes by
allowing the sender to send 150 or 0 to the receiver, and the receiver decides whether or not to return 300 or 0.
Assuming that players are rational and money maximising, in equilibrium nobody sends any money. By backward
induction, receivers will prefer more money to less and not return anything to the sender, i.e. not reciprocate. The sender
anticipates this and prefers not to send anything to the receiver, i.e. not trust, because the payoff fromwithholding is higher
than sending and not receiving anything in return. The subgame perfect equilibrium is that neither sender nor receiver
sends any money. This forms the benchmark relative to which we can measure the trust and trustworthiness of senders and
receivers, respectively. It follows that there is low (high) temptation for the receiver to send 0, and this implies a low (high)
stake for the sender in trusting the receiver. The two games allow us to test our hypotheses within a wider domain of stakes.
In order to obtain measures of discrimination, we administered the trust game under different social identity conditions
using the strategy method (Selten, 1967). To keep sender and receiver tasks symmetric, in the experiment we allowed
receivers to choose “return” or “not return” under the understanding that the decision only applies if the sender had chosen
“send”. In practice, the sender's decision would not inﬂuence payoffs in the game if the sender does not send any money. To
make this explicit, we displayed games on the screen as extensive form representations consistent with this strategy
method setup (see Fig. 2). In the ﬁrst two rounds of the experiment, all senders and receivers stated their decision of
whether to send or not to send without knowing the social identities of their co-participants. One round was for the high
stake condition and the other the low stake condition, in counterbalanced orders across participants. We call these actions
default actions.
In the other rounds that followed, participants stated their decision based on every possible co-participant's social
identity type according to different social categories (see Table 1). There were 88 rounds in total. Using religious afﬁliation as
an example of a category, every participant was asked whether they would send or not send to co-participants of every
religious afﬁliation (type) we provided, i.e. Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, other or none. This process was
repeated for every type of every category, presented in random order after the tasks without social identity were performed.
We call these actions conditional actions. Each category thus constitutes an experimental condition.
In each round where participants could base their decisions on the co-participants' social identities, they were provided
with an additional endowment of 100 points from which they could spend an amount of their choice to increase the
probability of implementing their conditional action instead of their default action. Each point increases the probability by
1%, and each point unspent accrues as experimental payoffs. This incentive compatibly elicits theirwillingness to discriminate
(WTD). When calculating experimental earnings, we applied the participant's stated WTD for the condition in concern to set
the probability that the conditional action rather than the default action was to be used, and randomly determined subject
to this probability.
As an example, consider a high stake game where a participant chooses to send 150 to co-participants of high religiosity,
and 0 to other types of co-participants. Assume also that the default is to send 0. A WTD of 20 points means that if the
participant is subsequently randomly matched with a high religiosity co-participant for the purpose of calculating
experimental earnings, there is a 20% probability that the choice of sending 150 is implemented, and a complementary
probability of 80% that the default action of sending 0 will be implemented. AWTD of 100 points means sending 150 to the
high religiosity co-participant for sure, and sending 0 to a medium or low religiosity co-participant for sure. Higher WTD
values increase the probability that discriminating decisions are used to determine earnings and therefore represent the
decision maker's willingness to pay for social identity information to afford discriminating actions.
This method of eliciting WTD is novel and has two advantages. First, it experimentally models the costliness involved in
discrimination activities, e.g. it takes time and effort to ﬁnd out another person's religiousness or political inclination. This
introduces an externally valid dimension to the test. In retrospect, observed decisions in previous experiments without thisTable 1
Social identity categories and types used in the experiment with resulting experimental conditions.
Condition Social identity category Types per category
0 None (benchmark)
1 Religious denomination Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Muslim, other, none
2 Religiosity High, medium, low
3 Course Applied science, arts, business, economics, pure science, social science, other
4 Nationality Chinese, Malaysian, UK, other
5 Campus location China, Malaysia, UK
6 Ethnicity Black, Chinese, Indian, Malay, Middle Eastern, White, other
7 Political orientation Left-wing, right-wing
8 Voluntary participation Active member, inactive member, not a member
9 Gender Male, female
10 Age r15 years; 16–20; 21–25; 26–30; Z31
11 Birthday group Even- and odd-numbered calendar days
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pant's social type. Second, the costliness of discrimination is in a way a disincentive to discriminate that mitigates demand
effects in terms of discriminating actions, and in doing so incentive compatibly reveals the demand of the individual who
despite of this cost goes for it. That said, we should not and do not try to remove all demand effects from the experiment, for
we are interested in those germane to the act of discriminating on the basis of social identity—to which we can clearly
attribute as the cause of action.
Fig. 2 shows the experimental interface employed to elicit decisions. The interface shown in this example is asking
participant 39, assigned to the sender role (Person A) to make decisions in the religiosity category for a low stake game
(Round 4). The game tree displays the actions and associated payoffs for participants in both roles. The dark shaded button
indicates the benchmark decision this participant has already indicated previously, which cannot be changed (SEND). The
participant must make trust decisions in the religiosity category by clicking on either the SEND or NOT SEND buttons for
each possible co-participant religiosity type, namely “High”, “Medium” and “Low” religiosity. The participant then indicates
what proportion of the 100 points to allocate towards implementing the relevant conditional choice, i.e. their stated WTD.
Once all these decisions have been made, the participant clicks on CONFIRM to enter them and proceed to the next round,
which involves a different category.
We administered a pen-and-paper questionnaire after the completion of the trust game task to collect additional
measures. Beliefs were elicited as participants' expectations of co-participant actions in the trust game. Participants were
asked (in their roles and for every possible value in every social identity category) to state the probability that such a type of
co-participant would choose to send. Participants were paid depending on how close these beliefs were to true distribution
of choices observed in the experiment, and payments were computed according to the quadratic scoring rule (Selten, 1998).
We also recorded each participant's own demographic characteristics for each of the social identity categories in order to
classify them in terms of the values for each category shown in Table 1. Notably, we elicited individual religiosity according
to the Glock and Stark (1965) dimensions using the denomination-robust 8-item instrument by Rohrbaugh and Jessor
(1975) which yields our religiosity measure. It takes into consideration different dimensions of religion, namely belief, ritual,
consequences, theology, and experience. It delivers an individual's overall score between 0 and 32 (see Hill and Hood , 1999).
3.2. Hypotheses
Piecing together the mosaic of results given by the literature from the perspective of religious identity and con-
nectedness, we shall use our experiment to test the following four hypotheses. These explanations of behaviour are not
mutually exclusive and could operate in concert, potentially coexisting or reinforcing each other. We cater for these pos-
sibilities in the analysis.
Hypothesis 1 (Statistical discrimination). Senders generally believe that receivers of higher religiosity are trustworthier, and
statistically discriminate by being more likely to trust them more than receivers of no or lower religiosity.
The ﬁrst possibility for the expression of religiosity in terms of economic behaviour is statistical discrimination (e.g.
Anderson et al., 2006) when a person's social identity contains information regarding particular behaviour tendencies that
can feed into strategic considerations, e.g. beliefs of trustworthiness. Statistical discrimination in the trust game applies only
to senders, as they must anticipate the likelihood that receivers will fulﬁl or abuse their trust if invested. Tenets such as
charity, neighbourly love and the Golden Rule are common to all religions and may confer a trustworthy reputation on
religious people (e.g. Spilka et al., 2003, p. 172). If statistical discrimination based on religiosity is present in the current
experiment, all senders regardless of their own religiosity should be more likely to behave trustingly towards receivers of
greater religiosity levels. Senders would therefore be more likely to send to receivers of higher religiosity, compared to
receivers of lower religiosity, and this effect should increase with the sender's religiosity.
Hypothesis 2 (Ingroup love). Religiously afﬁliated senders are more likely to invest trust in receivers who are afﬁliated to
the same religion, relative to receivers who are not religiously afﬁliated or afﬁliated to a different religion. This effect
increases with the sender's religiosity.
Religiosity is a fundamental measure of religiousness as an individual. It might vary across religious afﬁliations. In turn, it
weakens connectedness, e.g. from variances in religious doctrine and prescriptions for behaviour. Further, it is arguably
more subtle than religious afﬁliation, which may serve mainly as a badge of membership. It follows that while religiosity
might be a weaker marker of religious connectedness, it could serve to amplify discrimination effects based on religious
afﬁliation, which increases the salience of religious categories as social markers.
Thus, the degree to which people exhibit biased intergroup behaviour is related to the strength of their identiﬁcation
with the group concerned, and in turn increases cooperation through stronger social preferences (Farnham et al., 1999; Chen
and Xin, 2009). In particular, greater discrimination can result from a loss in (implicit) self-esteem in people who highly
identify with a particular social group that is undergoing a threat, i.e. a perceived negative evaluation by others (Smurda
et al., 2006). In the current context this hypothesis suggests that greater trust in co-participants of the same religious group
is relatively stronger in more religious participants in either role. Such effects are reinforced by individual religiosity, which
embodies closeness nurtured through joint participation in activities. This, in turn, increases trust by increasing religious
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more likely to send to receivers belonging to the same creed, compared to receivers who are atheists of followers of other
creeds, and this effect should increase with the sender's religiosity.
Hypothesis 3 (Religious afﬁnity). Religiously afﬁliated senders are more likely to invest trust in receivers who are afﬁliated
to some—regardless of which—religion. This effect increases with the sender's religiosity.
The third possibility we test is that people consider their religious afﬁliation or religiosity a pertinent social identity and
exhibit biased intergroup behaviour (i.e. ingroup favouritism or outgroup prejudice) towards others depending on whether
or not they are also religiously afﬁliated to some creed—irrespective of whether or not it is the same one. For example,
former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair articulated this thinking publicly at the Westminster Faith Debate
on “Religion in Public Life” held in London on 24 July 2012,2 “I ﬁnd a connection with people who are of faith, even though
they're of a different faith to my own, precisely because there is a certain space, philosophically and emotionally, you can
congregate around”. Put differently, this weakens the religious connectedness relative to that between individuals of the
same creed. That said, religious afﬁnity does not extend to group membership, and its effect should be relatively weaker. A
religious afﬁliate would thus be more likely to send in the trust game to another who is afﬁliated to some religion—
regardless of whether or not it is the same creed, and this effect should increase with the sender's religiosity.
Hypothesis 4 (General prejudice). Religious senders are generally more biased, such that they are more likely to send to
receivers with the same non-religious social identity.
Finally, since the middle of the last century (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954), psychological studies have repeatedly
identiﬁed links between individual religiousness and attitudes of prejudice. Such prejudice is counter to religious teachings
of charity, forgiveness, love and compassion. This link is complex and dependent on a number of other factors including
religious orientation, social desirability and doctrinal attitudes towards particular out-groups (Spilka et al., 2003, Chap-
ter 14). Links between religiosity and prejudicial attitudes have been demonstrated repeatedly (Allport and Ross, 1967;
Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger and Jackson, 2005; Hunsberger, 1996; Jackson and Hunsberger, 1999). We
consider the possibility that religious people are generally more disriminating in the context with the weakest religious
connectedness. If this holds, we should ﬁnd that senders of higher religiosity have greater WTD across all social identity
categories or overall. We should also ﬁnd that religious senders are more likely to send to the “ingroup” based even on non-
religious categories. In experimental terms, we are thus testing for the effect of religion on the individual's inherent dis-
position to discriminate.
3.3. Procedure
We ran the experiment at the China, Malaysia, and UK campuses of the University of Nottingham. All campuses use
English as the medium of instruction, and share common degree structures and syllabi. This participant pool affords high
direct comparability of data collected from these diverse cultures. The cultural diversity of our sample widens the study's
domain of validity. Such diversity increases the number of subjects of each social identity type. Thus, there is a much larger
number of ingroup and outgroup combinations, which we shall also use to test for the cultural sensitivity or robustness of
our ﬁndings. We used a computerised interface in English with 545 student volunteers (273 senders and 272 receivers)
recruited by poster and e-mail announcements for 90-min sessions of 20–40 participants. The experimental software was
programmed in Visual Basic 6, and the computerised text was in English.
Our experiment followed the standards of cross-cultural experimental economics (Roth et al., 1991; Herrmann et al.,
2008). Instructions, comprehension quiz questions, belief elicitation and demographic questionnaire were provided in the
respective local languages. The English version was always available to participants in China and Malaysia on demand. The
original English version was ﬁrst translated to Chinese and Malay, and then back translated to English to check for con-
sistency. Any inconsistencies were resolved in consensus with the co-authors on this project. Translations were performed
by three people who are not co-authors on the project, but are native speakers of Chinese or Bahasa Melayu and English. All
of them have professionally worked in the respective two languages. The English version of the experimental instructions is
found in the online appendix.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the sender or receiver role throughout the experiment, and made trust
game decisions ﬁrst for socially unidentiﬁed co-participants and then for each of the social identity categories and types as
described (see Table 1), for both the low and high stake conditions, in individualised random order. After all experimental
sessions were completed, participants were randomly matched experiment-wide across the three locations, and one social
identity category was selected randomly to determine earnings. The participants' total earnings were the points from the
game, those remaining from the WTD endowment, and payments depending on the accuracy of their beliefs in one ran-
domly chosen belief task, with the answer compared to the statistical return rate of the sample for the type of participant.
We paid participants at the rates of Renminbi (RMB) 0.20, Ringgit Malaysia (RM) 0.08 and Pounds Sterling (d) 0.04 per point2 Tony Blair is founding patron of the Tony Blair Faith Foundation and recently stepped down as the Special Envoy of the Middle East Quartet. The
quote was extracted from http://faithdebates.org.uk/debates/2012-debates/religion-and-public-life/religion-public-tony-blair-rowan-williams/ (2012).
Fig. 3. Statistical discrimination: Senders' and receivers' beliefs and acts of trust and reciprocity (%) depending on co-participant level of religiosity (RLEV
(other)) pooled for both stake conditions. Each graph represents participants grouped by their own religiosity level (RLEV (own)). The standard errors of the
means ranged from 0.64 to 3.80 but are not displayed for the sake of presentational clarity.
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allow for experiment-wide participant matching over the three locations. We paid participants in the three locations RMB
63.68, RM 28.66 and d14.65 on average. Each session lasted approximately 1.5 h. The exchange rate between the three
currencies we used was determined using the Big Mac Index published annually by The Economist magazine.4. Results
Before testing our four hypotheses we look at some basic features of the data. Table A1 provides the distributions of
participant types of each category across the three locations, and a summary of mean WTD, beliefs and actions across
conditions and types by roles and locations. Religiosity scores ranged from 0 to 30 and the average was 11.9. The mean age
was 20.5 (standard deviation of 1.74). There are more females (122) than males (65) in the Malaysian sample, more males
(137) than females (27) in the Chinese sample, and almost as many females (96) and males (98) in the UK sample. In ethnic
and religious terms, China is most homogeneous with 162 ethnic Chinese, 134 atheists and 25 Buddhists, out of 164 par-
ticipants in total. Malaysia and UK are relatively heterogeneous, with Chinese (106) and White (115) as majority ethnicities,
and Buddhists (61) and Christians (56) as majority religions, out of 187 and 194 participants in total, respectively. In
Malaysia and UK, the non-majority religions are all represented, apart from no Jewish participant in the Malaysia subsample.
In the high (low) stake baseline games where decisions could not be conditioned on the social identity of co-participants,
38.1% (56.0%) of senders chose to trust, and 27.9% (43.0%) of receivers chose to reciprocate. Further details may be found in
Table A1.
4.1. Preliminaries
We ﬁrst check for independent effects of religiosity on trust, to conﬁrm the result from previous studies that forms our
departure point. Our measure of religiosity is RELI, which is the mean centred to avoid multi-collinearity in our regressions
Table 2
Random effects regressions to test for statistical discrimination. The data is from the religiosity condition. Models 1, 4, 5 and 6 are based on data from all
senders, 2 from senders without religious afﬁliation, and 3 from senders with religious afﬁliation. Dependent variable BELIEF stated probability of receiver
returning, and WSEND¼WTD atypeþð1WTDÞ  adefault , where WTD stated willingness to discriminate, atype the conditional action chosen for a certain
receiver type, and adefault the default action. RLEV in this table refers to the co-participant's religiosity level. Random effects are at the participant level.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Explanatory (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
variables BELIEF BELIEF BELIEF BELIEF WSEND WSEND
All Atheists Afﬁliates All All All
STAKE 0.044*** 0.067*** 0.022 0.044*** 0.166*** 0.151***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017)
FEMALE 0.037 0.030 0.042 0.037 0.059 0.072**
(0.023) (0.033) (0.033) (0.023) (0.039) (0.037)
RELI 0.027* 0.004 0.053** 0.052** 0.007 0.002
(0.014) (0.030) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023)
RLEV 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.020* 0.003
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011)
RLEV by RELI 0.012
(0.008)
BELIEF 0.331***
(0.042)
CONSTANT 0.320*** 0.329*** 0.287*** 0.320*** 0.475*** 0.369***
(0.021) (0.029) (0.033) (0.021) (0.035) (0.036)
Overall r2 0.044 0.045 0.058 0.045 0.039 0.095
N 1602 798 804 1602 1602 1602
*** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:01.
** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:05.
* Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:1.
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do not in both the high (t-test, p¼0.780, 2-tailed henceforth) and in the low stake condition (p¼0.758), or for receivers in
either the high (p¼0.775) or the low condition (p¼0.886). To corroborate, individual level random effects binary logit
regressions controlling for beliefs, stake and gender show that religiosity does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence trust and trust-
worthiness (p¼0.921 and p¼0.375, respectively; see Table A1 for details). As there is no evidence for an independent
inﬂuence of religiosity on trust and trustworthiness.
Senders spent an average of 21.4 and receivers 22.0 out of a hundred points to increase the probability of implementing
their conditional actions (i.e. WTD) in the religious afﬁliation condition, where actions could be conditioned on the co-
participant's religious denomination. WTD rises with one's religiosity level at 19.3, 21.2, and 30.9 for low, medium and high
religiosity, respectively. Senders spent an average of 20.9 and receivers 20.0 points on WTD in the religiosity condition,
where actions could be conditioned on the co-participants level of religiousness. WTD rises with one's religiosity level at
19.8, 19.9 and 26.0 for low, medium and high religiosity, respectively. The same pattern holds for receivers at 19.5, 23.0, and
29.6 (18.7, 21.8, and 21.5), respectively, for low, medium, and high religiosity. Further, 58.6% (50.7%) of senders and 48.2%
(43.9%) of receivers discriminate on the basis of religious afﬁliation (religiosity) in the sense that they choose different
conditional actions for different types of co-participants.3 With information of religious afﬁliation (religiosity), 23% (22.7%)
of behaviour differs from that in the baseline: 9.2% (10.1%) increase and 13.8% (12.7%) decrease trust. As described in Section
3.2, this widely observed discrimination can take a number of forms as expressed in our four hypotheses, which we
test next.
To control for and to test the interplay of effects from multiple variables and their interactions, we use multivariate
analysis. In the following subsections, our regressions include individual-level random effects to control for the potential
non-independence of multiple observations per individual. We never provided participants with feedback between choices
so there is independence between observations across participants. We always control for low and high stake conditions
(STAKE¼1 for the high stake condition and ¼0 for the low stake condition), and for own gender (FEMALE¼1 for females and
¼0 for males) due to known gender effects on trust game behaviour (Croson and Buchan, 1999).4 Our regressions always3 For the Malaysia and UK subsamples, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference between trust in the baseline and all information conditions overall. As for the
Chinese subsample, there is lower trust in the age, religion, religiosity, ethnicity, education, political orientation and voluntary participation conditions.
Welfare is lower if we assume a uniform distribution of types. See our t-tests in the online appendix OA1.
4 We test for gender discrimination across the three locations in view of their different gender distributions, and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect in the
Malaysian subsample but not in the China and UK subsamples. Gender discrimination also has no signiﬁcant interaction effect with religiosity. See online
appendix OA2.
Table 3
Random effects regressions to test for ingroup love. Models 7, 8, 9 and 10 are on data from the religious afﬁliation condition. Models 70–90 analyse data from
the ethnicity condition. Models 7 and 70 are based on data from all senders, 8 and 80 from senders without religious afﬁliation, 9 and 90 from senders with
religious afﬁliation, and 10 from all receivers. The dependent variable for senders is WSEND¼WTD atypeþð1WTDÞ  adefault , where WTD stated will-
ingness to discriminate, atype the conditional action chosen for a certain receiver type, and adefault the default action. The dependent variable for receivers is
WRETURN, and computed as such. Random effects are at the participant level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Explanatory (7) (8) (9) (70) (80) (90) (10)
variables WSEND WSEND WSEND WSEND WSEND WSEND WRETURN
All Atheists Afﬁliates All Atheists Afﬁliates All
BELIEF 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.125*** 0.139*** 0.171*** 0.110*** 0.070***
(0.027) (0.039) (0.039) (0.029) (0.041) (0.041) (0.023)
STAKE 0.152*** 0.157*** 0.146*** 0.141*** 0.138*** 0.142*** 0.109***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.009)
FEMALE 0.060 0.060 0.074 0.048 0.041 0.064 0.017
(0.038) (0.057) (0.052) (0.037) (0.057) (0.051) (0.043)
RELI 0.000 0.017 0.017 0.007 0.013 0.004 0.052**
(0.024) (0.053) (0.033) (0.024) (0.052) (0.033) (0.026)
INGROUP 0.048*** 0.022 0.061** 0.043*** 0.050* 0.040 0.024*
(0.016) (0.028) (0.026) (0.016) (0.028) (0.027) (0.013)
INGROUP 0.037* 0.008 0.034 0.006 0.016 0.006 0.014
by RELI (0.020) (0.040) (0.029) (0.020) (0.041) (0.031) (0.016)
CONSTANT 0.452*** 0.480*** 0.421*** 0.452*** 0.461*** 0.444*** 0.381***
(0.029) (0.044) (0.044) (0.028) (0.044) (0.044) (0.029)
Overall r2 0.055 0.063 0.050 0.046 0.061 0.038 0.035
N 3730 1862 1868 3728 1859 1869 3638
*** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:01.
** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:05.
* Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:1.
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alternative models are reported in online appendix OA3).4.2. Statistical discrimination
Statistical discrimination implies that senders believe that some types of receivers are trustworthier than others. These
stated beliefs are given by the dependent variable BELIEF¼0 to 1. According to Hypothesis 1, a sender, irrespective of her
own social identity, uses the receiver's religiosity to form an expectation of their trustworthiness. Participants should
therefore be willing to pay more than in identity conditions unrelated to any possible statistical discrimination. Our control
condition is a “birthday” category where actions were conditioned on whether the co-participant was born on an even or
odd day of the month. There, mean WTD is 17.7 and its conﬁdence interval is 16.1–19.2. The mean WTDs of the religious
afﬁliation and religiosity categories are 21.4 and 20.9, respectively, i.e. outside the interval. We also examine how beliefs
regarding the trustworthiness of receivers vary with the decision maker's religiosity using a religiosity level variable RLEV.
This variable was used in the experiment to elicit participants' beliefs and actions contingent on the co-participant's low
(RLEV¼0 if religiosity questionnaire score is 0–10), medium (RLEV¼1 if score is 11–20) and high (RLEV¼2 if score is above
20) religiosity.5 We test this effect on senders across all religious afﬁliations. Further, to test if being of a similar religiosity
level reinforces statistical discrimination, we interact RLEV with RELI.
Senders' beliefs that low, medium, and high religiosity receivers would act trustworthily are 0.33, 0.41 and 0.43, respectively,
pooled over both stake conditions. Average beliefs and actions are shown broken down by participants' own religiosity levels in
Fig. 3. Senders of diverse religiosities believe that receivers of higher religiosity are more likely to return (top left ﬁgure), and are
more likely to send to them (top right ﬁgure). Receivers of diverse religiosities believe that senders of higher religiosity are more
likely to trust (bottom left ﬁgure), and are as likely to return to senders of different religiosity levels.
Regression analysis (Table 2) conﬁrms that more religious people are trusted more by people across different levels of
religiosity, as the RLEV coefﬁcient is positive and signiﬁcant in models 1–3. This result holds overall, for people without or
with religious afﬁliation, as demonstrated by the regressions on the pooled sample (model 1) and subsamples disaggregated
by people without (model 2) or with (model 3) religious afﬁliation. Further, the statistically insigniﬁcant RLEVRELI
coefﬁcient in model 4 shows that senders of different levels of religiosity are as likely to believe that receivers of high
religiosity are trustworthier, conﬁrming that statistical discrimination holds across senders irrespective of religiosity.5 The reason for this variable is that eliciting such conditional responses on the basis of every possible value of co-participant religiosity score is
impractical. We also use RLEV in Fig. 3 merely for the purpose of clearer exposition to break down the beliefs and decisions of participants according to
their own level of religiosity.
Fig. 4. Ingroup love: Senders' change in trust, relative to the baseline and as a percentage of trust in the baseline, when faced with an ingroup or outgroup
co-participant. The top ﬁgure shows the change in trust observed in each campus. The bottom ﬁgure shows this for religious participants or atheists in the
religious afﬁliation or ethnicity conditions (bottom).
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sponding type of co-participant (see the variety of types per category in Table 1). We do not use the conditional action atype (¼1 if
send and 0 otherwise) as dependent variable as it is not incentive compatible. This is because the conditional actions of participants
with WTD¼0 will never be implemented and therefore carry no weight, while the default action adefault should carry full weight.6
The dependent variable we use is the weighted average of senders' actions WSEND¼WTD atypeþð1WTDÞ  adefault . WRETURN
is the weighted average of receivers' actions and calculated accordingly. Model 5 shows a marginally signiﬁcant RLEV effect in the
pooled sample, while model 6 shows that there this becomes insigniﬁcant once we control for beliefs. Models 5 and 6 show that
trust actions depend on religiosity of the co-participant and beliefs of the co-participant's trustworthiness. These beliefs are con-
sistent with actions, and beliefs are themselves increasing in religiosity. This supports the statistical discrimination hypothesis.7Result 1 (Statistical discrimination). Senders of all levels of religiosity believe that receivers of higher religiosity are trust-
worthier, and behave consistently with this belief by trusting them more.6 That said, our results are robust to adopting atype as the alternative dependent variable.
7 The results of Models 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 are robust to the inclusion of interaction term of RLEVRELI.
Fig. 5. Religious afﬁnity: Plot of linear ﬁt for senders' beliefs and religiosities. Senders' beliefs that receivers will return increase with sender religiosity if
both participants are religiously afﬁliated (right), but not if even one of the two is not religiously afﬁliated (left). Linear regressions give us β¼0.003 and
p¼0.776 for non-afﬁliated participants and β¼0.022 and p¼0.012 for afﬁliated participants.
Table 4
Random effects regressions to test for religious afﬁnity. The data is from the religious afﬁliation condition. Models 11–13 are based on data from all senders,
14 and 15 are on senders without and with religious afﬁliation, respectively. Dependent variable BELIEF stated probability by senders (by receivers) of
receiver returning (or sender sending), and WSEND¼WTD atypeþð1WTDÞ  adefault . whereWTD stated willingness to discriminate, atype the conditional
action chosen for a certain co-participant type, and adefault the default action. Random effects are at the participant level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Explanatory (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
variables BELIEF WSEND BELIEF BELIEF BELIEF WSEND
All All All Atheists Afﬁliates All
STAKE 0.061*** 0.152*** 0.061*** 0.089*** 0.033*** 0.159***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
FEMALE 0.020 0.062 0.019 0.009 0.006 0.058
(0.023) (0.038) (0.023) (0.033) (0.033) (0.039)
RELI 0.002 0.002 0.019 0.037 0.011 0.004
(0.015) (0.025) (0.016) (0.031) (0.026) (0.028)
INGROUP 0.026*** 0.049*** 0.026*** 0.046*** 0.024 0.045***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
INGROUP 0.007 0.038* 0.010 0.041* 0.004 0.036*
by RELI (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020)
AFFILIATE 0.051*** 0.008 0.039*** 0.051*** 0.005
(0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022)
BELIEF 0.134***
(0.027)
AFFILIATE 0.038** 0.034* 0.013
by RELI (0.015) (0.018) (0.026)
CONSTANT 0.382*** 0.455*** 0.380*** 0.436*** 0.326*** 0.506***
(0.017) (0.029) (0.017) (0.024) (0.030) (0.028)
Overall r2 0.010 0.055 0.012 0.036 0.014 0.037
N 3730 3730 3730 1862 1868 3738
*** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:01.
** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:05.
* Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:1.
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According to Hypothesis 2, higher religiosity strengthens the identiﬁcation of participants with the religious group they
are afﬁliated to, and thereby ampliﬁes ingroup biases based on afﬁliation. We use WSEND as the dependent variable. To test
for ingroup biases, we deﬁne a dummy variable INGROUP that takes on the value of 1 when participants are making
decisions conditional on participants that are of the same type as those for the category in concern. In this case of ingroup
biases in religious afﬁliation, INGROUP¼1 when co-participants are of the same religious afﬁliation, and ¼0 otherwise.
When people have information about others, they use it to guide their actions. In turn, this feeds into behaviour. Thus, our
models of WSEND include BELIEF to control for statistical discrimination. However, beliefs do not necessarily explain
Table 6
Random effects regressions to test for general prejudice. The data is from all senders in the non-religion conditions. Dependent variable WTD stated
willingness to discriminate, BELIEF stated probability of receiver returning, and WSEND¼WTD atypeþð1WTDÞ  adefault , where atype the conditional
action chosen for a certain co-participant type, and adefault the default action. Random effects are at the participant level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
(17) (18) (19)
WTD BELIEF WSEND
All All All
STAKE 0.012* 0.045*** 0.154***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
FEMALE 0.023 0.006 0.047
(0.025) (0.020) (0.035)
RELI 0.029* 0.033** 0.000
(0.015) (0.013) (0.022)
INGROUP 0.009** 0.022***
(0.004) (0.006)
INGROUP 0.001 0.001
by RELI (0.005) (0.008)
BELIEF 0.170***
(0.013)
CONSTANT 0.200*** 0.410*** 0.447***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.025)
Overall r2 0.009 0.016 0.060
N 4272 16,438 16,438
*** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:01.
** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:05.
* Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:1.
Table 5
Correlation between religiosity and willingness to discriminate for different categories. Spearman ρ coefﬁcients for and associated p-values given.
Category Senders Receivers
Low stake High stake Low stake High stake
ρ p ρ p ρ p ρ p
Gender 0.089 0.146 0.142 0.020** 0.014 0.825 0.026 0.676
Age 0.149 0.015** 0.047 0.449 0.066 0.288 0.062 0.318
Nationality 0.117 0.057* 0.042 0.492 0.012 0.843 0.025 0.691
Religion 0.127 0.038** 0.178 0.004*** 0.101 0.101 0.095 0.124
Religiosity 0.115 0.060* 0.117 0.056* 0.040 0.518 0.115 0.063*
Ethnicity 0.193 0.002*** 0.109 0.076* 0.083 0.177 0.002 0.969
Campus 0.130 0.034** 0.125 0.042** 0.057 0.356 0.029 0.645
Course 0.108 0.079* 0.111 0.070* 0.062 0.317 0.050 0.422
Politics 0.121 0.048** 0.083 0.178 0.060 0.334 0.046 0.454
Participation 0.117 0.055* 0.024 0.702 0.042 0.498 0.000 0.998
Birthday 0.091 0.137 0.118 0.054* 0.002 0.973 0.099 0.108
*** Signiﬁcance at or above the 0.01 level.
** Signiﬁcance at or above the 0.05 level.
* Signiﬁcance at or above the 0.1 level.
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discrimination with BELIEF, INGROUP is a measure for taste-based discrimination, such that remaining ingroup effects are
attributable to it. We include the mean centred measure of individual religiosity RELI as well as the interaction term
INGROUPRELI, which tests if ingroup biases are strengthened by the decision maker's religiosity.
Tests are performed on data from the religious afﬁliation condition rather than the religiosity condition where there is no
clear sense of group membership. Note that participants were not told their own religiosity level according to our survey
measure nor asked to state their perception of their own religiosity in absolute terms or relative to other participants. Fig. 4
shows the percentage change in trust actions in WSEND conditional on the receiver's religious afﬁliation, relative to the
baseline where decisions are made unconditionally. In UK and Malaysia, where most participants have religious afﬁliations,
we observe increases in trust for the ingroup relative to the baseline, i.e. ingroup favouritism. In China, where most8 Also because of the taste-based motive to acquire information, beliefs do not necessarily positively correlate with WTD.
Fig. 6. General prejudice: Group biases of religious afﬁliates and atheists across non-religious conditions. The ﬁgure shows the mean trust by senders
conditional on receivers being of the same (ingroup) or a different (outgroup) type as them per category. Trust by religiously afﬁliated participants are
grouped in the upper block, and trust by atheists are grouped in the lower block.
S.H. Chuah et al. / European Economic Review 90 (2016) 280–301 293participants are atheists, we observe decreases in trust for the outgroup relative to the baseline, i.e. outgroup prejudice. We
scrutinise this econometrically.
Referring to Table 3, model 7 shows that senders are more trusting towards those of the same religious afﬁliation
(INGROUP is positive and signiﬁcant) and this effect increases with one's religiosity (INGROUPRELI is positive and mar-
ginally signiﬁcant). The ﬁgure in Table A3 shows that ingroups are consistently trusted more than outgroups by people
across different religions. This ﬁnding is also robust to contextual differences across groups and societies.9 This ingroup
effect does not hold for atheists but for religious afﬁliates (see models 8 and 9, respectively). We run the same tests on
receivers and ﬁnd only a marginally signiﬁcant positive INGROUP effect on WRETURN of the pooled data (see model 10),
which corroborates the taste-based discrimination interpretation. Thus, we ﬁnd support for Hypothesis 2.10
We also consider the possibility that religious afﬁliation serves as a proxy for ethnicity and vice versa. To investigate this,
we analyse actions conditional on ethnicity. Regressions similar to models 7–9 on data from the ethnicity condition (models
70–90) show signiﬁcant ethnic biases (INGROUP is signiﬁcant in model 70). This effect is driven by atheists, as INGROUP is
signiﬁcant for participants without religious afﬁliation (model 80) but not for participants with religious afﬁliation (model
90). If religious afﬁliation is used as a proxy for ethnicity, and it is actually ethnicity that drives behaviour, then the inﬂuence
of ethnicity should be stronger than that of religion. Instead, we ﬁnd that religious participants discriminate more on the
basis of religious afﬁliation, while atheists discriminate more on the basis of ethnicity.11 Fig. 4 illustrates this contrast.12
Result 2 (Ingroup love). Religiosity enhances the ingroup favouritism shown by senders towards receivers of the same
religious afﬁliation. This effect is driven by people with religious afﬁliations. Instead, atheists discriminate on ethnicity,
which can be proxied by religious afﬁliation. Evidence of ingroup favouritism by receivers is marginally signiﬁcant.
4.4. Religious afﬁnity
Hypothesis 3 posits that religious afﬁliation or religiosity can serve as social identities irrespective of creed. Result 1
suggests this, but a stricter test involves data from the religious afﬁliation condition where there is a clear demarcation of
social identity for self and other. This test distinguishes itself from previous ones in that it considers the possibility that
people trust each other more so long as they both have some religious afﬁliation, even if they are of different religious
denominations. Fig. 5 plots the linear ﬁt of sender's beliefs in the trustworthiness of the receiver as a function of the sender's
religiosity in the absence (left) or the presence (right) of religious afﬁnity, and hints at an effect of religious afﬁnity, which
we properly test with a multivariate analysis.
To test this formally, we derive the dummy variable AFFILIATE, which takes on a value of 1 when a participant who is
religiously afﬁliated faces a task where the other is also religiously afﬁliated, regardless of creed. It takes on a value of zero
when either the participant is an atheist or the task involves trusting an atheist. Referring to Table 4, AFFILIATE is positive9 Members of majorities and minorities of homogeneous (China) and heterogeneous (Malaysia and UK) societies consistently trust the ingroup more.
Further, participants residing in more heterogeneous societies intermingle with more diverse people, and this might inﬂuence the nature of group biases,
but we ﬁnd that patterns of discrimination are alike. Details are provided in online appendix OA4.
10 The results of models 7–10 are robust to the exclusion of BELIEF.
11 We also test this on campus and nationality, but ﬁnd no signiﬁcant biases (see online appendix OA2).
12 The relative impact of ingroup favouritism vis a vis outgroup prejudice can be captured by a comparison of conditional ingroup and outgroup data to
unconditional data. Relative to the baseline, the ingroup is trusted more in Malaysia and UK, and in China the outgroup is trusted less.
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atheists. However, it is insigniﬁcant in model 12, showing us that despite this belief they are not trusted more. Model 13
includes an AFFILIATERELI variable and ﬁnds that such beliefs are ampliﬁed by the sender's religiosity. Model 16 corro-
borates model 12 and further shows that there is no higher order effect on actions.
The effect of religious afﬁnity on actions is weaker than that of being afﬁliated to the same denomination: in models 12
and 16, INGROUP and INGROUPRELI are positive and signiﬁcant, while AFFILIATE and AFFILIATERELI are not. This supports
the arguments presented in Hypotheses 2 and 3 that connectedness enhances group identiﬁcation. Beliefs only partially
drive behaviour on the basis of mere religious afﬁnity. Beyond statistical discrimination driven by beliefs, taste-based
discrimination holds only if people are afﬁliated to the same denomination—not just by mere religious afﬁnity. We further
scrutinise the negative and signiﬁcant INGROUP effect and its interaction term in model 13, which implies that religiosity
diminishes the belief effect for those from the same denomination. This peculiar result of lower beliefs of trustworthiness in
the ingroup is driven by atheists, as shown by our regressions on data disaggregated by atheists and religious afﬁliates
(models 14 and 15, respectively). It suggests that atheists are more suspicious of each other, even though it does not lead to
lower trust. In contrast, religious afﬁliates ultimately trust the ingroup more. These behaviours suggest taste-based
discrimination.
Result 3 (Religious afﬁnity). Senders' religiosity enhances beliefs about religiously afﬁliated receivers' trustworthiness
regardless of whether or not they belong to the same denomination, but they do not invest more trust despite this belief.
4.5. General prejudice
Hypothesis 4 posits that more religious people discriminate more over a range of social identities including non-religious
ones. Our univariate tests examine whether more religious participants have relatively higher WTD across the different
social identity categories we use. We construct, for each participant, an average WTD as the unweighted mean WTD across
all of them. The correlation between average WTD and religiosity is positive and signiﬁcant across both roles (ρ¼0.087,
p¼0.0449). This relationship is signiﬁcant for senders (ρ¼0.123, p¼0.0442) but insigniﬁcant for receivers (ρ¼0.045,
p¼0.4658). Further, the average religiosity of those whose WTD is zero throughout the experiment (μ¼33.5, n¼73) is
signiﬁcantly less than that of others (μ¼40.5, n¼457, p¼0.01). We also examine the correlation between religiosity and
WTD across social categories (see Table 5). Again, these correlations are generally insigniﬁcant for receivers. For senders,
information on religious afﬁliation, religiosity and ethnicity are salient and serve as social identiﬁers that markedly separate
participants. In turn, the correlations of religiosity and the WTD along these dimensions are robustly signiﬁcant. Referring to
Table 6, model 17 shows that WTD is positively related to religiosity, which suggests that more religious people are more
prone to religious-based discrimination.
Further, we test if religious participants are generally more prone to ingroup favouritism, i.e. even if social identities of
co-participants are unrelated to religion. Fig. 6 shows that both religious afﬁliates and atheists generally favour the ingroup
over the outgroup by trusting the ingroup more across different categories of social identity. Models 17–19 test WTD and
ingroup biases on data concerning all non-religion conditions. As found above, WTDs increase with religiosity (model 17).
This effect is marginally signiﬁcant. For beliefs (model 18), we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant INGROUP effect for senders
overall, but no RELI interaction effect. For actions (model 19), we also ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant INGROUP effect for
senders overall, but no RELI interaction effect. This result is robust to controls for respective conditions.13
Result 4 (General prejudice). Religiosity is positively associated with the general willingness of senders to discriminate
across a range of non-religious social identities. However, participants of different religiosity are as prone to ingroup
favouritism.5. Discussion
Inter-religious interaction is an increasingly important social phenomenon. However, previous experimental work has
yet to establish univocal evidence regarding its direct, independent effects on trust and trustworthiness. To better under-
stand this issue we conducted a trust game experiment across three countries with participants of different religious
denominations and levels of religiosity. Our experiment was designed to test four hypotheses for indirect effects of reli-
giosity we derived from these previous studies. Taken together these hypotheses propose that religiosity affects economic
behaviour indirectly by moderating (a) the way we treat others of the same and different social groups and (b) the
expectations and behaviour those we interact with develop towards us.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarised as follows. First, religiosity is a strong social identiﬁer which is used as a basis of
statistical discrimination by senders of varying religiosities (Result 1). Both religious and non-religious people believe that13 We also controlled for each category with condition-identifying dummies interacted with INGROUP to test the inﬂuence of religiosity on the extent
of ingroup biases, as an alternative to the regressions disaggregated by religious afﬁliation. The same result holds: the willingness to discriminate increases
with religiosity, but ingroup biases are generally invariant to religiosity. See the regressions in Table A5.
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show to others who share the same faith (Result 2). Senders of all religions believe receivers of the same faith to be more
trustworthy and follow these beliefs with actions in step with their own degree of religiosity. Third, we found a religious
fellow feeling or afﬁnity between religious people across different faiths, i.e. irrespective of whether they share the same
one or not (Result 3). This was expressed in the greater belief people with religious afﬁliation have in the trustworthiness of
others similarly afﬁliated. As before, individual religiosity ampliﬁes this effect. This kind of religious afﬁnity, however, does
not generate quite the same positive effect on actual behaviour. Fourth, while we found that religiosity is associated with a
willingness to discriminate across non-religious categories, observed ingroup favouritism did not vary with religiosity
(Result 4). Since the 1950s, Adorno et al. (1950) and Allport (1954) have postulated general religious prejudice, but have
since been met with scant reliable evidence.
In summary, we uncovered evidence that religion operates indirectly through social identities and religious afﬁliation,
which are used as a basis for discrimination in trust games. Religious identity is one dimension that tells decision makers
how they are connected to those with whom they interact. The nature and degree of discrimination observed generally
depended on the nature and degree of connectedness between individuals. The behavioural patterns we observed across the
four main results showed that the closer people are the more they trust each other. Religious ingroup effects on beliefs carry
over strongly to actions, in contrast to the weaker effect when religiosity was known but religious afﬁliation was unknown,
and when religious afﬁliation was known (but) to be of a different creed. These effects increased with one's religiosity,
which is an indicator of how rooted one is in a particular social group. We believe that the diversity in our participant pool
lends our results good domain validity. Our study is general, as opposed to creed-speciﬁc, also in its explanation for how
religion affects behaviour.
In addition to the evidence relating to our hypotheses we generally found that people are willing to pay for the chance to
discriminate, be it for statistical or taste motives. We designed an incentive-compatible measure of the willingness to dis-
criminate which was shown to be signiﬁcantly related to our other variables. We believe that our measure may be deployed in
other social identity contexts to guide policy related to discrimination in labour markets and other speciﬁc areas.Acknowledgements
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See Tables A1–A5 .Table A1
Distribution of subject types in each condition across three locations and WTD, beliefs and actions across conditions and types by roles and locations.
Explanatory variables Malaysia China UK Total
Gender
Male 65 137 98 300
Female 122 27 96 245
Age
o16 0 0 0 0
16–20 119 110 105 334
21–25 67 52 84 202
26–30 1 2 4 7
430 0 0 1 1
Nationality
British 1 1 119 121
Chinese 33 161 24 218
Malaysian 96 1 5 102
Other 57 1 46 104
Religion
Buddhist 61 25 15 101
Christian 37 5 56 98
Table A1 (continued )
Explanatory variables Malaysia China UK Total
Hindu 15 0 12 27
Jew 0 0 7 7
Muslim 26 0 3 29
Other 6 0 1 7
None 42 134 100 276
Religiosity
Low 41 87 103 231
Medium 97 73 66 236
High 39 2 22 63
Ethnicity
Black 15 0 6 21
Chinese 106 162 32 300
Indian 22 0 16 38
Malay 11 0 0 11
Middle Eastern 4 0 0 4
White 1 2 115 118
Other 28 0 25 53
Education
Arts 0 17 42 59
Business 81 133 18 232
Economics 9 7 29 45
Engineering 26 2 50 78
Science 16 2 22 40
Social science 9 1 22 32
Other 46 2 11 59
Politics
Left 157 87 126 370
Right 29 77 67 173
Participation
Active 6 8 5 19
Inactive 67 59 78 204
Not a member 110 91 106 307
WTD Malaysia China UK
Sender Receiver Sender Receiver Sender Receiver
Gender 0.31 0.25 0.21 0.28 0.12 0.17
Age 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.18 0.17
Nationality 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.14 0.16
Religion 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.15 0.17
Religiosity 0.26 0.16 0.21 0.27 0.15 0.18
Ethnicity 0.30 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.13 0.14
Campus 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.29 0.14 0.16
Education 0.31 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.18 0.17
Politics 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.14 0.16
Participation 0.26 0.16 0.24 0.26 0.14 0.15
Birthday 0.25 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.11 0.14
Beliefs Malaysia China UK
Sender Receiver Sender Receiver Sender Receiver
Baseline
0.46 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.36 0.39
Gender
Male 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.36 0.39
Female 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.35 0.38
Age
o16 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.30 0.32
16–20 0.46 0.46 0.40 0.49 0.35 0.38
21–25 0.51 0.48 0.44 0.49 0.35 0.39
26–30 0.37 0.41 0.38 0.43 0.34 0.35
430 0.32 0.32 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.32
Nationality
Same 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.36 0.39
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Beliefs Malaysia China UK
Sender Receiver Sender Receiver Sender Receiver
Different 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.51 0.35 0.37
Religion
Buddhist 0.38 0.43 0.37 0.42 0.34 0.35
Christian 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.29 0.29
Hindu 0.43 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.38 0.40
Jew 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.41 0.42
Muslim 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.35
Other 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.38 0.31 0.31
None 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.28 0.33
Religiosity
Low 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.40 0.29 0.34
Medium 0.44 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.36 0.38
High 0.41 0.41 0.48 0.47 0.41 0.41
Ethnicity
Black 0.38 0.38 0.33 0.41 0.32 0.34
Chinese 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.43 0.35 0.33
Indian 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.48 0.33 0.39
Malay 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.40 0.31 0.33
Middle Eastern 0.43 0.47 0.46 0.51 0.34 0.38
White 0.39 0.41 0.37 0.40 0.33 0.34
Other 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.38 0.31 0.33
Campus
Malaysia 0.49 0.51 0.39 0.46 0.34 0.35
China 0.42 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.33 0.36
UK 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.33 0.40
Education
Arts 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.31 0.34
Business 0.44 0.42 0.38 0.43 0.32 0.34
Economics 0.46 0.47 0.43 0.42 0.34 0.37
Engineering 0.42 0.42 0.37 0.42 0.32 0.33
Science 0.40 0.44 0.39 0.43 0.35 0.37
Social science 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.49 0.30 0.35
Other 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.40 0.32 0.34
Politics
Left 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.50 0.35 0.38
Right 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.47 0.30 0.35
Participation
Active 0.45 0.46 0.50 0.55 0.42 0.45
Inactive 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.42 0.34 0.36
Not a member 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.30 0.33
Birthday
Odd 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.52 0.34 0.40
Even 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.34 0.39
Actions Malaysia China UK
Sender Receiver Sender Receiver Sender Receiver
Baseline
0.48 0.32 0.49 0.45 0.44 0.31
Gender
Male 0.53 0.34 0.51 0.46 0.41 0.30
Female 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.47 0.43 0.31
Age
o16 0.41 0.32 0.43 0.45 0.39 0.30
16-20 0.49 0.35 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.29
21-25 0.54 0.35 0.51 0.42 0.45 0.28
26-30 0.47 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.28
430 0.46 0.32 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.29
Nationality
Same 0.51 0.35 0.51 0.46 0.44 0.31
Different 0.51 0.34 0.50 0.44 0.44 0.29
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Actions Malaysia China UK
Sender Receiver Sender Receiver Sender Receiver
Religion
Buddhist 0.49 0.33 0.52 0.45 0.46 0.32
Christian 0.51 0.33 0.51 0.44 0.46 0.32
Hindu 0.48 0.32 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.30
Jew 0.45 0.31 0.45 0.45 0.41 0.29
Muslim 0.50 0.32 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.30
Other 0.46 0.32 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.29
None 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.43 0.43 0.30
Religiosity
Low 0.44 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.40 0.31
Medium 0.51 0.33 0.49 0.42 0.43 0.30
High 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.30
Ethnicity
Black 0.42 0.31 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.30
Chinese 0.53 0.35 0.53 0.46 0.44 0.30
Indian 0.47 0.32 0.45 0.41 0.43 0.30
Malay 0.46 0.29 0.48 0.40 0.43 0.30
Middle Eastern 0.45 0.34 0.45 0.41 0.42 0.29
White 0.52 0.34 0.53 0.44 0.44 0.30
Other 0.49 0.32 0.44 0.40 0.40 0.29
Campus
Malaysia 0.55 0.36 0.47 0.40 0.42 0.27
China 0.48 0.32 0.50 0.46 0.41 0.27
UK 0.52 0.32 0.51 0.46 0.44 0.29
Education
Arts 0.46 0.30 0.48 0.45 0.43 0.29
Business 0.51 0.34 0.50 0.43 0.42 0.28
Economics 0.48 0.36 0.51 0.44 0.43 0.28
Engineering 0.50 0.31 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.30
Science 0.47 0.33 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.30
Social science 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.43 0.45 0.29
Other 0.46 0.33 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.30
Politics
Left 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.29
Right 0.47 0.35 0.47 0.44 0.38 0.28
Participation
Active 0.50 0.32 0.54 0.45 0.46 0.30
Inactive 0.44 0.29 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.29
Not a member 0.46 0.32 0.44 0.47 0.39 0.29
Birthday
Odd 0.49 0.32 0.51 0.44 0.42 0.30
Even 0.50 0.32 0.48 0.43 0.42 0.29
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Table A3
Ingroup favouritism is consistent across religious denominations.
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Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In Out In
Explanatory
variables
Buddhist Christian Hindu Jew Muslim Other None
Outgroup 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.31 0.49 0.69 0.47
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01)
Ingroup 0.47 0.50 0.56 0.38 0.60 0.69 0.48
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.18) (0.08) (0.15) (0.03)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table A2
Religiosity does not increase trust or trustworthiness.
Explanatory WSEND WRETURN
variables All All
BELIEF 0.498 0.06
(0.344) (0.545)
STAKE 0.783*** 0.979***
(0.183) (0.248)
FEMALE 0.229 0.104
(0.181) (0.318)
RELI 0.011 0.166
(0.113) (0.192)
CONSTANT 0.007 0.39
(0.197) (0.309)
LL 46.851 308.114
N 516 502
Random effects regressions to test for religiosity effects. The data is from the religious afﬁliation condition. For senders, we use the dependent variable
WSEND¼WTD  atypeþð1WTDÞ  adefault , whereWTD stated willingness to discriminate, atype the conditional action chosen for a certain receiver type, and
adefault the default action. For receivers, the dependent variable is WRETURN, and computed as such. Random effects are at the participant level. Standard
errors are in parentheses. **Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:05. *Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:1.
*** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:01.
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Table A4
Table of main regression variables.
Variable Values Description
WTD 0 to 1 Percentage spent on implementing action conditional on co-participant's type
BELIEF 0 to 1 Sender's (reciever's) stated belief that receiver's (sender's) will return (send)
WSEND 0 to 1 WTD * conditional action þ (1-WTD) * default action
RISK 0 or 1 0 for low risk game, 1 for high risk game
FEMALE 0 or 1 0 if male, 1 if female
RELI 1.48 to 2.27 Participant's religiosity, mean centred average of items from religiosity inventory
RLEV 0, 1 or 2 Co-participant's religiosity level, 0 if low, 1 if medium, 2 if high
INGROUP 0 or 1 0 if co-participant is of a different type than the self, 1 if of the same type
AFFILIATE 0 or 1 0 if participant or co-participant are atheists, 1 if both have a religion
Table A5
Regressions for ingroup biases in non-religious categories with condition-speciﬁc ingroup dummies “IN[condition]”.
Explanatory WTD BELIEF WSEND
variables All All All
STAKE 0.012* 0.045*** 0.154***
(0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
FEMALE 0.023 0.006 0.047
(0.025) (0.021) (0.035)
RELI 0.029* 0.033** 0
(0.015) (0.013) (0.022)
INAGE 0.196*** 0.446*** 0.001
(0.019) (0.016) (0.015)
INGENDER 0.217*** 0.404*** 0.022*
(0.019) (0.015) (0.013)
INNATIONALITY 0.181* 0.446***
(0.019) (0.016)
INETHNICITY 0.206*** 0.390*** 0.009
(0.019) (0.015) (0.012)
INCAMPUS 0.204*** 0.437*** 0.004
(0.019) (0.015) (0.014)
INEDUCATION 0.239*** 0.407*** 0.012
(0.019) (0.015) (0.012)
INPOLITICS 0.157*** 0.406*** 0.027*
(0.019) (0.016) (0.015)
INPARTICIPATION 0.196*** 0.422*** 0.026*
(0.019) (0.015) (0.014)
INGROUP 0.002 0.023***
(0.002) (0.006)
INGROUP by RELI 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.008)
BELIEF 0.169***
0.013
CONSTANT 0.460***
(0.027)
Overall r2 0.015 0.021 0.061
N 4272 16438 16438
Random effects regressions to test for non-religious condition-speciﬁc ingroup effects. The data is from all senders in the non-religion conditions. We use
the dependent variable WSEND¼WTD  atypeþð1WTDÞ  adefault , where WTD stated willingness to discriminate, atype the conditional action chosen for a
certain receiver type, and adefault the default action. Random effects are at the participant level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:1.
*** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:01.
** Signiﬁcance level is denoted by po0:05.
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Supplementary data associated with this paper can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euro
ecorev.2016.03.008.References
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